"MY OWN VIEW IS THAT THIS IS backward: the biology of consciousness offers a sounder basis for morality than the unprovable dogma of an immortal soul. It's not just that an understanding of the physiology of consciousness will reduce human suffering through new treatments for pain and depression. That understanding can also force us to recognize the interests of other beings--the core of morality."
Steven Pinker, Time Magazine.
The second major problem with Pinker's view of the soul (that there is no soul) ... and the mind (that it is a pure function of brain states) ... is that it fails the existential test of truth.
In other words, it flies in the face of human experience.
My lead-in quote from Pinker is telling. He claims the core of morality is recognizing the interests of other human beings. Wha? Morality? Amongst biochemical machines? Why should a piston care about the feelings of a drive shaft? Why should a Mitsubishi Eclipse recognize the interests of a Honda CR-V? Why should a chemical machine operated by a 3 pound computer made of meat care about the core of morality or human suffering?
Talk about a tension point in your worldview! Saying we are all machines, and truly believing it, are two different things.
Nancy Pearcy writes,
To be consistent, the determinist is forced to deny the testimony of experience. But that is not a valid move in the worldview game: The point of offering a worldview is to explain the data of experience, not to deny it. Anything less is ducking the issue. Thus we can be confident that any philosophy that leads to determinism is simply false. It fails to account for the reality of human nature as we experience it.
Total Truth, p. 394
Pearcy adds, "the fact of the matter is that everyday of our lives we are forced to act on the assumption that freedom and choice are real, no matter what we believe theoretically."
Dr. J.P. Moreland discusses other objections to Pinker's worldview in Scaling The Secular City, pp 80-89.
First, there is the distinctiveness of mental and physical properties. Mental events do not have the same properties as physical events. They have different attributes. The law of identity, therefore, tells us that they are not the same thing. A brain weighs three pounds. A thought doesn't. End of story.
Second, there is the private access issue. Each of us has private access to our own thoughts. Observers who are monitoring our brains are dependent on us to know what we are thinking. They can observe brain tissue activity ... not thoughts. Thoughts don't show up on MRI's.
Third, there is the experience of first-person subjectivity. Here is a thought experiment (notice I did not say brain-experiment :-) Suppose a deaf scientist became the world's leading expert on the neurology of hearing. It would be possible for her to know and describe everything there is to the physical processes involved in hearing. However, something would still be left out of such a description -- the experience of what it feels like to be a human who hears.
Fourth, there is the issue of secondary qualities such as colors, tastes, sounds, smells, and textures. When the world is reduced solely to the physical, it seems these secondary qualities do not really exist. I have a close friend who is a physician and knows quite a bit about neurology. He tries to make the case that there really is not green in the world. He says that when we look at grass, our brains tell us we are seeing green ... but in reality, he claims we are only seeing photons and wavelengths. My response is to say pish-posh (in a nice way). Those of us who are not blind (or color blind) know what green is. It is self-evident. I have experienced it and so have you. But the physicalist, like Pinker, must defend the claim that there really is no green in the world. Pish posh.
Fifth, there is the matter of intentionality. Mental states, like thoughts, point to things beyond themselves even if those things do not exist. The mind has the ability to transcend itself and be of or about something else. This "aboutness" is not a property of anything physical.
Sixth, there is the problem of personal identity. If a table had its legs replaced, would it be the same table? No. Of course not. It is now a different table. What about if a soldier loses his legs in combat? Is he still the same person ... not does he look the same ... did his identity change? I sure hope not. But a physicalist would have to argue that his identity did change.
Seventh, there is the problem of morality, responsibility and punishment. Physicalist worldviews, like Pinker's, imply determinism. If actions are not the result of free choices, then does punishment really make sense? Do we punish kids with muscular dystrophy for spilling their drinks? No. That is absurd. Punishment, responsibility and morality makes sense when our actions are freely chosen.
As Galen Strawson says, "we find it is impossible not to believe that we are radically free and responsible in our choices and actions." Ordinary life teaches us that we have "ultimate buck-stopping responsibility for what we do, of a kind that can make blame and punishment and praise and reward truly just and fair."
Pinker's view of consciousness fails the sniff test because it fails to fit our human experience.
Further reading:
, Dr. J.P. Moreland, Baker Book House
, Nancy Pearcy, Crossway Books
None of this post actually does any arguing against a strong view of determinism. Assertions about the freedom of the will are just that, assertions. They especially have no place in a worldview which teaches God's omniscience. The fact of omniscience negates any sort of claim about free will in the sense that Pearcy would use it. As Christians we believe in divine providence and the sovereignty of God and, thus, determinism on this account does not deny the testimony of experience; rather it defines and establishes our experience.
Here are a few counterpoints to the rest of this post:
1. A brain weighs three pounds and produces thoughts through a complex physiological process. If thoughts were these purely disembodied mental entities then we wouldn't need a brain to have them and, clearly, we do (at least on this side of reality). I'm not an advocate of physicalism in the same manner that Pinker is, but to deny the findings of the cognitive sciences doesn't make any sense. It seems to me that they have done us a favor in bringing us closer to an incarnational approach to knowledge.
2. Again, you're conception of what a thought is is mistaken. Sure, an MRI won't tell doctors what you're thinking, but a PET or MEG scan might. I, however, agree with you in principle here as technology is not capable of producing the kind of detailed reading that would be required to determine specific neural activity in every case. However, current technology shows us that it is at least possible in theory since we are able to tell general neural activity. For example, neuroscientists would be able to tell that you are thinking about something pleasurable because the pleasure center of your brain is more active than other systems, but they could not tell what specifically you are thinking. This is not a limitation of "private access", rather it's a limitation of technology.
3. I'm not sure what this has to do with anything. If nothing else, neuroscience confirms the reality of first-person subjectivity and people like Pinker are using this truth to deny the existence of absolute abstract truth.
4. This is a good wedge to crack into Pinker's view, though from the wrong angle. It is true that we experience color because our visual systems are designed to absorb the appropriate wavelengths of light reflected by external physical objects. If our eyes didn't have the color cones that they do, grass would not be green because our eyes would not be able to absorb the appropriate wavelengths being reflected from it. So, as a matter of experience we say that grass is green and from a purely physical standpoint "green" is not an inherent property of the grass. Now, the problem for Pinker's (and your friend's) view comes when we try to answer why grass aborbs all wavelengths except those that produce green. When we take a picture of grass, the picture is green even though there are no cone cells used by the camera to capture or interpret the image. On light sensitive paper grass appears as green because, as I mentioned, it absorbs all other wavelengths of light. That is an inherent property of the grass and that is why we can really say grass is green even apart from all human experience. I've not seen this issue addressed by neuroscientists, but I haven't read a whole lot either.
5. If a mind has the ability to transcend itself and be of or about something else, does that mean it is independent of "me"? As a possessor of a mind, do I also have this ability to transcend myself and be of or about something else? What does this look like? Also, can you give an example of a mental state or thought pointing to something "beyond" itself?
6. Most physicalists would argue that as long as one's neurological processes remain largely intact, then you could locate that bundle of processes anywhere and maintain identity. In your example, if the table's identity is found in it's top, then you could replace the legs and still call it the same table. If I had the legs replaced on any of my tables, I wouldn't say it's a different table. If, however, I had the top replaced, I most likely would say it's a different table.
7. Again, determinism isn't as morality/reponsibility crushing as it seems to be on the surface. Punishment is meted out on the basis of law and authority regardless of free will. If there was a law against spilling drinks, then the child with muscular dystrohpy would be breaking it. Simply because the child is unable to refrain from breaking the law when given the drink does not necessarily remove culpability. This is easily shown by refering to Paul's description of the unbeliever's circumstance in Romans 8. The unbeliever is unable to obey God but surely God will hold him accountable for is disobedience. Moral responsibility is based on what God requires, not on what man is capable/incapable of doing.
Posted by: Jared | January 31, 2007 at 09:59
Welcome Jared. Always glad to get more Christians commenting and interacting.
I read you are from Chattanooga and you link to Doug Wilson's blog. This tells me a little about you. Did you go to Covenant? If not, where? Where do you worship in Chattanooga? Great town, btw.
Before I respond to your response ... help me out by defining your terms.
Define how you are using ....
* determinism
* free will
*free will in the sense that Pearcy uses it
* "strong" determinism
Posted by: Mr. Dawntreader | January 31, 2007 at 18:53
Mr. Dawntreader,
I am a graduate of Covenant College (B.A. Philosohpy, '05) and I attend First Presbyterian Church (PCA) located near the heart of downtown. Here are the definitions you asked for:
determinism - the belief that all things (including human choices) which have occured, are occuring and will occur have been predetermined such that there is no possibility of the contrary occuring. [Note; this is a logical consequence of advoacting the traditional Christian views of God's omniscience and omnipotence]
free will (taken from my blog) - The ability to choose from a variety of "competing" desires within the framework of any given set of physical and spiritual circumstances. [Note; it is not the ability to choose whatever one desires irrespective of those circumstances, nor is it characterized by the possibility to have chosen otherwise than what one does choose]
free will in the sense that Pearcy uses it - the ability to choose based on nothing but the council of our own will by virute of being created in God's image [Note; from what I can gather, she would not necessarily be opposed to a libertarian construction of free will even though her theological training has (or should have) taught her otherwise]
"strong" determinism - same as determinism above. Technically speaking it should be "hard" determinism, not "strong" determinism but I don't advocate a hard determinism in a strictly philosophical sense. Rather, I advocate a determinism that results from believing in the omniscience and omnipotence of God. I would say that the future free acts of humans are determined by God's omniscience and omnipotence as a result of His sovereignty and providence. [Note; a "soft" determinism is a view in which a Pearcy-like conception of free will is compatible, in some way, with the traditional views of God's omniscience and omnipotence]
Posted by: Jared | January 31, 2007 at 23:34
Jared,
Great to have a fellow Covenant grad pay a visit to my blog. In my case, class of '85 (ICS).
I have a fondness in my heart for First Pres for two reasons. One, they financially supported my family for years as we served God on the mission field. Two, they are supporting my neice, Jennifer as she serves God in China.
Wonderful church.
Posted by: Mr. Dawntreader | February 01, 2007 at 05:23
continuing on ...
Thank you for the definitions. Those help enormously.
Your coming at the issue of determinism from the point of a reformed world and life view. You and I would agree that there is only one possible time line (past, present and future). Because of God's omniscience and omnipotence, it must be that way. Neither of us are "open theists", in other words.
The determinism that Schaeffer spoke of, and Moreland, and Pearcy etc etc is what you are calling philosophical determinism. Pinker may think of it as biological or chemical determinism.
It is a view that we are automotans. We are machines. Life is a series of conditioned reflexes and automated responses caused by genetic programming bumping up against our environment.
It is the logical outworking of a physicalist view of man ... that man is soulless ... consciousness is an illusion ... everything is a by product of evolution.
I know you and I would be allies in critiquing that world and life view.
The issue of providence, sovereignty, and predetermination take us in a whole new ... and interesting direction. Maybe when I come to Chattanooga this spring I can buy you a cup of Joe and we can work it out ;-)
Now that I know your frame of reference, I'll take a closer look at all of those counter points you raised above.
Posted by: Mr. Dawntreader | February 01, 2007 at 05:41
"If thoughts were these purely disembodied mental entities then we wouldn't need a brain to have them and, clearly, we do (at least on this side of reality)."
How do you explain the documented evidence of near death experiences? In particular, those who have witnessed events in this world while temporarily dead -- at least in terms of brain activity?
Also, is the soul physical? If so, is there a region in our brain where it resides?
"For example, neuroscientists would be able to tell that you are thinking about something pleasurable because the pleasure center of your brain is more active than other systems, but they could not tell what specifically you are thinking."
At best, a neuroscientist can make inferences based on correlating brain activity. Correlating brain activity with pleasure is a far cry from first-hand introspective awareness.
Interesting point about the wavelength. I still believe greenness exists ... regardless of how reductionist we choose to get in describing it.
A physicalist may claim the identity of a person has not changed ... but they would not be consistent with their worldview in doing so.
Now, what if we perfected brain surgery to the point that we could successfully transplant brains. If you had a brain transplant and nothing else changed, would you still be you?
"Punishment is meted out on the basis of law and authority regardless of free will."
Well ... Stalin meted out punishment based on that philosophy. It seems to me, however, that justice is missing from this equation.
Shouldn't justice figure into whether one is deserving of punishment?
Posted by: Mr. Dawntreader | February 02, 2007 at 20:23
I certainly would not say that the soul is physical and I would account for near death experiences by saying that I see no reason why one could not experience events in the world apart from their physical body (i.e. via their soul) and saying that their ability to recall such experiences is due to the fact that the brain was still functioning while the soul was experiencing. In other words, while the person is experiencing these events separate from their body (seemingly at least) their brain, nevertheless, encodes the experience just as if it was also present. Such a thing could be compared to the powers of recollection that a drug addict has about his experiences with mind-altering substances. While there was nothing physically crawling all over him, his brain has encoded the experience as if it was real and, thus, he is able to recall it happening. Why should near death experiences be otherwise?
You're right, correlating brain activity with pleasure is a far cry from first-hand introspective awareness. Neuroscientists could put me and my wife in a dark room in which they can't see our activity and when they record pleasure activity they have very limited resources as to the details; they would be able to tell what kind of pleasure we were having but not exact details. Because they are fellow humans, however, they are capable of empathizing and can say "I know what he's experiencing because I've experienced it too" and, in this respect, are capable of providing insight into my individual introspective experience. If this were not so, psychology as a field of scientific inquiry would have died off a long time ago.
I agree with you that "green" exists outside of our visual system. God created grass so that it would reflect and absorb the wavelengths that it does; this is true with all of creation.
It would depend on the phsyicalist's understanding of what constitutes "me" (i.e. his conception of personal identity). As far as I know, "me" is always primarily associated with, or defined essentially as, one's mental/brain content. So if my brain could successfully be transplanted to another body, I would remain me just with different body. I am convinced that brain transplants are a long ways off as such a transplant would require a reworking of the motorskills of the brain in order for it to function properly within the context of a new nervous system (and that's the simple problem).
Stalin was not God. Justice should always figure into whether one is deserving of punishment, but since when does free will dictate what is just? It seems to me that the law governs free will, not the other way around.
Posted by: Jared | February 05, 2007 at 14:25
"Why should near death experiences be otherwise?"
Because there are documented cases where the dead individual observed things that were outside of the room. In one famous case, a temporarily dead person observed and heard things that were nowhere near where his brain-dead body lay. I am talking about things that were miles away. There was no opportunity for the brain to encode the events in some kind of minimally conscious state.
re: free will and justice.
"Since when does free will dictate justice?"
Free will does not dictate justice. But punishing someone for something that they did not choose to do of their free will is unjust.
Do you and your wife have any children? Don't you factor in whether your child willfully disobeyed you versus whether they were acting out of ignorance? Isn't it right and proper to learn about what led up to the disobedience in order to properly determine your response?
Posted by: Mr. Dawntreader | February 09, 2007 at 06:20
To my knowledge, there has never been a doccumented case of a brain-dead individual recovering, could you cite a reference? I know that people have recovered from comas and persistent vegitative states, but never brain death. The scenarios you present (hearing, seeing things outside of the room, etc.) and the recollection of those experiences can all be accounted for through the way I described as long as the brain is functioning in any sort of normal (albeit damaged) capacity. Similar experiences would be lucid dreams, use of psychedelic drugs, an OBE induced via deep meditation (e.g. astral projection) and the like.
I have a personal example; many years ago I had a lucid dream in which I was struck by lightning. I woke up panicked, was physically unable to move and could feel every single cell in my body tingling as if I had really been struck. I couldn't see or hear anything for about 30 seconds (during which the tingling slowly died down and I recovered use of my muscles) but I knew it had been a dream and that I was awake; I still remember it vividly. While I was physically sleeping in my bed in Georgia, my dream took place at a foster home complex in Mississippi. I was there on a missions trip (it was a Palmer Home project) with my church and we were working on constructing some new buildings for them. It was hot and humid (in the middle of summer) and the storm came up faster than we anticipated. I remember very specific details about what I was doing, the people that were there, etc.; very detailed. However, I was not really present there any more than someone experiencing and OBE is present. My brain wasn't really experiencing the humid heat, the texture and weight of sheet metal, the feel of sweat dripping down my face from the labor; yet I have this vivid memory of those experiences. Again, why should OBE's be considered different? To speak of experiences beyond brain death is pure speculation on our part since they could not be doccumented due to the impossibility of the individual recovering.
If punishing someone for something they did not choose to do of their free will were unjust, then those who are in Hell do not belong there. A sinner has no choice but to sin, for that is all he can produce apart from faith in Christ. Is it just, then, that God should judge such a person even though he is not free, not even able, to do anything else? With God's in law our nature as an innate characteristic by virtue of being created in his image, no one can plead ignorance. Our conceptions of justice, however, are finite and always function within the context of humans as imperfect beings. When I have children and they do something wrong, I will indeed factor in whether or not there were rules in place to make them aware of their wrongdoing. However, even wrongdoing done in ignorance is willfully done and I believe that no on is ever forced to sin. My point here is that, unless there are provisions (and most legal systems have them), the law, and therefore justice, doesn't care whether you were forced to do something or not.
Posted by: Jared | February 09, 2007 at 10:32
Perhaps it's because I've come late to the party, but I haven't seen any direct discussion of nonreductive physicalism. Not all neuroscientists who study mind are reductivists like Pinker. Many, perhaps most, are nonreductive physicalists. That is, they recognize that mind is an emergent property of matter, but they also recognize that mind is not entirely reducible to matter. Thus, we do indeed have free will, although our freedom is bounded in some way by our biology.
It seems to me that nonreductive physicalism is thoroughly consistent with a Hebraic-Christian conception of the person. Indeed, it's probably more consistent with a Hebraic-Christian conception of the person than the Greek-influenced dualism or tricotism that is prevalent in popular Christianity. Further, a nonreductive physicalist position has the advantage of maintaining an orthodox theological position while countering determinism on its own grounds.
Check out Nancey Murphy's "Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies" for a thorough discussion. (Always check Nancey Murhpy on questions of faith/science or epistemology! ;-) )
Posted by: dopderbeck | February 09, 2007 at 15:52
Jared,
Re: citations. Please check out or buy the book Beyond Death, by Habermas and Moreland. Chapter 7 has 48 footnotes of studies for you to research ... including NDE's involving "no brain wave" deaths.
Re: the dream story. Cool story. Glad you had that dream and not me. ;)
Re: I think we'll have to agree to disagree about determinism and punishment. Invoking the incommunicable attributes of God ... his ability to reconcile man's responsibility and his sovereignty ... is not an effective defeater for Moreland's point about determinism not fitting with the notion of human moral responsibility and human punishment.
Posted by: Mr. Dawntreader | February 10, 2007 at 06:50
David,
I am not familiar with nonreductive physicalism. It sounds like an oxymoron to me, to be honest.
I purchased one Nancy Murphy book last summer when I was out at the Fuller Bookstore. I should have walked over to her office and had her sign it for me ;-)
Posted by: Mr. Dawntreader | February 10, 2007 at 06:53
Mr. Dawntreader,
I'll give the book a looksee, though I am (a) highly skeptical of any book that uses "evidence" and "immortality" in the same breath and (b) I am no fan of Moreland (or anyone else associated with evangelicalism who are attempting to 'break-in' to the philosophy arena). I would qualify that I do, indeed, believe in eternal life but the term "immortality" and the concepts traditionally associated with it have no place in a biblical anthropology. For something along those lines, it doesn't get much better than John Cooper's Body, Soul and Life Everlasting.
As for determinism, I understand the desire for agreeing to disagree. I think the problem is that "determinism" comes with too much philosophical baggage to be useful in discussion and "free will" cannot be adequately or appropriately defined within the context of God's providence. It seems to me that it comes down to a matter of personal preference on which side of the discussion one wants to err.
Posted by: Jared | February 11, 2007 at 17:07