This is a continuation of this post: The Problem of the Criterion II
Methodism is not a very good strategy because it leads to a vicious infinite regress. Note: methodism, as used here, is an approach to knowledge and not the John Wesley sort of Methodism.
Methodism implies that before I can know anything (P), I must know two other things: Q (my criterion for knowledge) and R (the fact that P satisfies Q). But the skeptic will ask, well how is it that you know Q and R? The methodist will scramble to come up with a new criterion Q' and R' to defend his claim, but this only sets up another challenge (to Q' and R') ... the vicious regress is set up.
Methodism is in trouble.
Modern day methodists usually try to dismiss the problem with a snarky comment about philosophers. Dissing it does not remove the challenge, however.
The most widely accepted criterion for knowledge in today's world is empiricial detectability (or a combination of observation and logic). For an interesting illustration of a methodist's approach, check out Joe Carter's Newton's Flaming Laser Sword post and read about Poppler's falsifiability demarcation criterion.
But empiricism does not escape the skeptical challenge. How do we know that what we think observe is truly the case, or how do we know that what we observe matches our criterion? And, can we really even observe our thinking on the matter? In other words, are our thoughts and ponderings observable? Technically, no. I can't see my thoughts ... can you see yours with your eyeballs? So if physical observations plus logic are the criterion for knowledge, then our thoughts must be disallowed because they are non-empirical. Logic is non-empirical too. We have a self-refuting, infinite regress on our hands. We are stuck, right?
Maybe not. There is a way out of the infinite loop. Something Chisolm called particularism.
Remember the two questions?
Question A. What is the extent of our knowledge?
Question B. What is the criteria of our knowledge?
The methodist tried to start with B. Chisolm (and others before him like Thomas Reid) suggest we start with A, and just say to heck with criteria ... at least for foundational points of knowledge. There are some things we all know. In fact, we can't not know them.
Like, I had eggs for breakfast yesterday morning (and I did, and I know it), or, there is a tree outside of my window, or, mercy is a virtue, or, 7 + 5 = 12, or to use Tom and Kevin's favorite illustration of knowledge, when I drop a pencil, I know it will in fact fall to the ground.
We, in fact, know many things without knowing how we know them or how to prove we know them ... in fact, we may not even be able to fully understand them, but we still know them.
To gain knowledge, we start with clear instances of knowledge: like murder is wrong, or running a red light is illegal, and then go on to formulate criteria for when something is wrong or illegal. In other words, we start with the clear instances of knowledge, build our criteria based on those clear instances, and extend our knowledge by using those criteria in borderline cases.
So is the battle over? Can we all agree that there is a way to know things, and that we do in fact know many things?
Nope. There are three objections I have encountered. Skeptics typically raise two objections to this approach. Calvinists often raise a third objection. More on these objections in the next post on the problem of the criterion.